The political upheavals that swept across the Middle East in 2011 and 2012, the socalled Arab Spring, have not only profoundly shaped and reshaped the domestic politics of Arab states, but also coincided with an ever-increasing Sunni-Shi'a division in the region. The new Middle East, as it is emerging in the 21 st century, is now faced with interconnected internal and external security concerns, forming a "regional security complex," which manifests itself through soft power (e.g. sectarian politics) and hard power (proxy wars), such as the complicated case of the Syrian civil war. This regional security complex is increasingly evident through interactions between subnational, national, regional, and international actors. These actors employ dichotomized discourses of demarcation between us versus them in order to mobilize greater popular support for political ends. Thus, along with violent conflicts, sociopolitical groups -sectarian, religious, nationalist, or ideological -are increasingly inclined to depict themselves (us) as protectors of an authentic identity threatened by outsiders framed as the Other (them) within a larger discourse.
Egypt, a key country in the Arab and Islamic world, constitutes no exception to this development. Since the fall of President Husni Mubarak in 2011, the country has experienced not only an opening of the political system but with it a noticeable discursive shift and change in identity politics, moving beyond the Islamist/secularist discourse of the past into a new realm of sectarian politics. The key driving forces behind this rhetorical shift are the newly founded Salafi political parties, which -having been largely apolitical under the presidencies of Anwar al-Sadat and have made a forceful entry onto the post-Mubarak political scene. As analyst Jonathan Brown remarked, prior to 2011 Salafis in Egypt "refrained from political participation, considering involvement in politics to be religiously forbidden." 2 However, this position changed dramatically with the 2011 uprising, as exemplified by the proliferation of Salafi forces and parties, including most prominently the Nour Party (Hizb al-Nur, literally "Party of the Light"), which argued that participation in the political process was possible without sacrificing its Islamist principles. 3 As Sami Zemani and Brecht De Smet explain, "the revolution . . . changed the dynamics of sectarianism" in Egypt, with formerly apolitical groups "such as the Salafis, but also the Copts, the Sufis, and the Shiites [now] forced to participate in the newly opened arena of civil society politics in order to protect their rights and interests." 4 Since their appearance on the post-2011 political landscape, the Nour Party and other Salafi political parties have emerged as potent players to the right of the Muslim Brotherhood, mobilizing significant segments of Egyptian society behind their program and ideological outlook. For instance, in the first free and fair postMubarak parliamentary elections of 2011 and 2012, the Nour Party and its Islamist allies 5 managed to capture no less than 25% of elected seats, thus coming second in the polls after the Brotherhood and its allies, and leaving the secular blocs in a distant third place. Moreover, in the subsequent presidential elections of 2012, the party threw its weight behind Mohamed Morsi in the second round of voting, thus helping the latter secure a narrow victory over his more secular rival Ahmad Shafiq. 6 Since then the Nour Party has weathered the trials and tribulations of internal divisions (in 2013 several members split off from the party and created the rival Homeland Party, or Hizb al-Watan) and the 2013 military coup that brought [ 
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6. "Egyptian Elections: Preliminary Results [Updated]," Jadaliyya, January 9, 2012, www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3331/egyptian-elections_preliminary-results_updated-; McTighe, "The Salafi Nour Party in Egypt." down the short-lived Morsi government; led to the banning of the Brotherhood and its affiliate, the Freedom and Justice Party; and the classification of the group as a terrorist organization. Throughout this turbulent period of time, the Nour Party charted a political path that led to it siding with the secular opposition and the generals against Morsi and the Brotherhood. This ensured Nour's survival and enabled it to emerge from the 2013 crisis as one of only a few remaining potent Islamist factions/parties in Egyptian politics, alongside the Homeland Party and 'Abd alMun'im Abu al-Futuh's Strong Egypt Party. 7 This article argues that the so-called Arab Spring, by changing internal and regional political structures, created an environment that enabled forces such as the Egyptian Salafis to play an important role in politicizing, securitizing, and mobilizing the masses. Egyptian Salafi forces, particularly the Nour Party, found themselves in positions to play a role in the country's power struggle. These forces have engaged different mechanisms to gain political legitimacy, most significantly through recourse to sectarian anti-Shi'a rhetoric and actions. As such, Egypt's Salafis have been tapping into and have been influenced by a regional trend of growing sectarian rhetoric and divisions between Sunni and Shi'i Islam that have been fuelled by regional state and nonstate actors for political purposes. Cases include the ongoing regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which, with its sectarian undertones, has exacerbated Sunni-Shi'a divisions, particularly in countries with sizeable, politicized Shi'a communities, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain.
What is so remarkable in the context of resurgent Salafism in Egypt and its recourse to sectarian rhetoric is the fact that -unlike many of the multi-sectarian states in the region -less than 1% of Egypt's population are Shi'a, 8 rendering them insignificant political players in the newly emerging body politic. Indeed, given the demographics, Shi'a in Egypt arguably pose little, if any, threat to the formidable traditional conception of Sunni identity in the country. 9 Moreover, Shi'i groups in Egypt have neither claimed a share of political power nor have they been engaged in struggles over economic resources, either at present or in modern history. In other words, there are no tangible security implications, be they economic or political, caused by Shi'a against Sunnis in Egypt. Lastly, given that Egypt has not had full diplomatic relations with Iran for over three decades, the tiny Shi'a community in Egypt has become largely depoliticized and unable to forge direct connections with the largest officially Shi'a Islamic republic. Shi Drawing on a range of sources and testimonies collected during field research in Egypt and Iran, 11 this article uses the concepts of "securitization" and "societal security" to develop an analytical framework that presents a unique examination of why and how Shi'a are depicted as the Other, and how they have been instrumentally securitized by the Salafis in post-Mubarak Egypt. The article's findings suggest that this securitization is driven mainly by three factors: 1) growing Sunni-Shi'a divisions in the broader region, and particularly by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, 2) Salafis' desire to present themselves as a political and ideological alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood, and 3) and a calculus to mobilize popular support and gain religious legitimacy in post-Mubarak Egypt.
The research presented in this article sheds light on the hitherto understudied Sunni-Shi'a politics in contemporary Egypt, thus highlighting how even a predominantly Sunni society is affected by the crosswinds of sectarianism in the region. Indeed, probing the sectarian discourse of Egypt's Salafi political parties should facilitate a better understanding of the internal and external dynamics that shape the region's growing sectarian conflict and are caused by the politics of "othering." This is particularly important given the ever-growing sectarian rhetoric, violence, and conflicts engulfing Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section looks at the theoretical framework of the argument. In this part the theory of securitization and its relevance to the argument will be defined and explained. The second section then examines how the Sunni-Shi'a divide in the region and in Egypt is constructed and securitized. This section argues that in order to gain popular legitimacy, Salafis adopted a policy of securitization of Shi'i identity intended to create the Other. In so doing, Salafis aim at politicizing sectarian identity, which enables them to mobilize Sunnis against Shi'a in Egypt and beyond. The third section then delves into understanding the dichotomous mechanism of us versus them conducted by Salafis to demonize Shi'a in Egypt and the region, both politically and theologically. Since this article aims to explore linkages between internal security concerns and its external causes and implications, the final section in turn studies the broader identity conflicts in the Middle East and the role of external actors in the widening sectarian divisions in Egypt. 11. These include public statements, party programs, video interviews, articles, government policies, and security services' statements, in addition to semi-structured interviews. In-depth individual and focus group interviews using open-ended questions were conducted with 20 politicians, members of parliament, heads of political parties, and journalists in Egypt in June 2013. In addition, four telephone interviews were conducted with Egyptian Shi'i activists, academics, and figures in January 2014. Two interviews were also conducted in Iran in August 2013 with two Iranian tourists who had visited Egypt in June 2013.
THEORIZING SECTARIAN POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Securitization and de-securitization (the process of moving an issue "out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere" 12 ) are the operative and most pertinent concepts for the article's central argument. While international attention has focused on Egypt's state security, this research moves beyond the conventional realist paradigm, and instead explores the concept of security more broadly by emplying the concept of "societal security," i.e., "the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions or actual threat."
13 Realists' state-centric approach arguably fails not only to predict, but also to explain, why and how the so-called Arab Spring and its subsequent and widespread intra-state insecurity have occurred and are occurring in the Middle East. Furthermore, the realist inter-state approach also fails to address internal and transnational identity-based conflicts in the region, such as the rise of societal ethno-sectarianism and the influence of non-state actors in the region.
By adopting a nontraditional approach toward security challenges in the Middle East, this article aims to understand the impact of the post-Arab Spring climate on the region's sectarian conflicts by studying non-state and nonmilitary aspects of critical security issues. Critical approaches have sought to "retake" conventional security analysis and revisit previously held truths surrounding major events that have reshaped the region's political and security dynamics, such as the September 11 th attacks in the United States or the Arab Spring. It is important therefore to move beyond the traditional conceptualization of the "identity" -a static and politically loaded term -as being at the root of Middle Eastern conflicts and to instead treat it as an elastic and discursively constructed phenomenon.
According to the Copenhagen School's perception of societal security, societies, like states, tend to defend themselves when they perceive threats to their identities. These threats can be imagined or real.
14 Along similar lines, Michael Sheehan argues that, "securitization is about constructing a shared understanding of what are to be considered security issues." 15 In sum, an issue becomes a security concern not merely because it exists, but because the issue can be construed as existential, and is then politicized, and opinion is radicalized and mobilized. 16 14. The Copenhagen School refers to scholars who argue, in opposition to traditional approaches to security studies, that security threats affect people in more ways than simply militarily. Scholars from this school have argued that security affects the political, economic, environmental, and societal sectors. The school's main contribution has been the last sector, introducing the concepts of societal security and societal securitization discussed in this article. that when an identity issue -be it religious, sectarian, or ideological -is portrayed as an existential security threat, it requires "emergency measures, and actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure."
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As one of the main forces shaping people's identities, religious or sectarian affiliation can be constructed and securitized for instrumental purposes so as to gain greater political power and popular legitimacy. In so doing, actors politicize religious or sectarian identities to mobilize support for politico-religious ends. The success of this process, however, entirely depends on the level of reaction and recognition it receives with respect to the politics of securitization and the efficacy of the securitizing actor. In short, a non-politicized issue is politicized (i.e., an ordinary subject becomes a political issue) and then securitized (becoming a security issue). This securitization process occurs through what Ole Waever refers to as a speech act: making people believe that an ordinary issue is a security issue or an existential threat. 18 Thus, a securitizing actor, through speech acts, socio-politically constructs security. A speech act is the arbitrary designation of a threat by speaking it, which in turn is labeled as exceptional in society and needs to be controlled or protected; this is how an issue is "securitized."
When a certain societal group perceives its identity as threatened, real or imagined, it tends to react by defending its identity. In so doing, it goes through the processes of politicization and securitization. Such a defensive mechanism may require, ultimately, the use of coercive means to protect its politicized identity. However, the Other may also perceive such defensive acts as aggressive acts that threaten its own identity. Defensive/offensive mechanisms between two or more societal groups then cause a so-called societal security dilemma. According to Ted Gurr, "the benefit of one group is an automatic loss for all the others."
19 When a group defends the identity it perceives under threat, it will act to defend it peacefully or through force. The success of this securitization process can be measured by how people receive, accept, and react to the perceived threat. Successful securitization, in terms of societal security, works when people accept an issue "as threatening the existence of a group's identity." 20 It is this framework of securitization that lies at the heart of the subsequent analysis into the postrevolutionary sectarian discourse and divisions in Egypt, which -as argued above -are in large measure driven by emergent Salafi political parties, including Nour. By employing the concept of securitization, this study posits that Salafis in post-Mubarak Egypt politically securitized Shi'a and portrayed Sunni identity as something that needs to be secured. As part of this process, Salafis employed the following tactics: firstly, they have sought to demonize and depict the Shi'a population as a threat to the Sunni majority through othering. Secondly, Salafis aim to legitimize and depict themselves as authentic protectors of true Sunni Islam and in opposition to other domestic Islamist forces deemed soft toward Shi'a. Thirdly, they have sought to link the small minority Egyptian Shi'a population to the broader sectarian divisions in the region by 17 ) of which they are the protectors, Salafis in Egypt allow themselves to take extraordinary political and even coercive measures to confront the Shi'i Other, which is delineated as an existential threat.
SALAFIS AND SECTARIAN POLITICS IN EGYPT
Historically speaking, Shi'ism is not new to Egypt. For almost three centuries (909-1171), the Fatimids, an Isma'ili Shi'i dynasty, ruled Egypt and North Africa. These historical roots have led to some familiarity among Sunni Egyptians of Shi'i thought, and even to the adoption of some common Shi'i traditions. Various interviewees, including a member of the Democratic Front Party (a liberal faction that merged with the Free Egyptians Party in December 2013), acknowledged this historical link asserting that:
Egyptians are affected by some Shi'a customs, such as the Prophet's birthday festivals, weddings, and sweets they distribute, which Egyptians inherited from the Fatimids. Average Egyptians observe the day of 'Ashura, fasting and cooking [a ceremonial meal to break the fast], even though it is Shi'a holy day. 22 This narrative of peaceful coexistence and the historical marriage of some Sunni and Shi'i traditions has been challenged in post-Mubarak Egypt by the Nour Party and others, both at the levels of rhetoric and action. Rhetorically, for instance, Nour and other Salafi activists have sought to disassociate Shi'ism from the Islamic fold, presenting Shi'a as infidels who do not believe in the Prophet Muhammad, worship 'Ali, insult important founding figures from Islamic history, and practice temporary (mut'a) marriage. More importantly, Salafis have sought to associate the Shi'a community with the regime in Tehran. As one Nour member of parliament (MP) in the short-lived 2012/13 People's Assembly noted in this regard:
I do not believe that there are Shi'a in Egypt. We reject any kind of relationship with Iran because they are Shi'a and they insult the [three of the four Rightly Guided] Caliphs. And they accuse 'Aisha of adultery. This is dangerous to see how Shi'a insult the caliphs and 'Aisha. They want to destroy our religion.
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Another senior Nour figure, Bassam al-Zarqa, argued along similar lines that:
there is a border-crossing, Shi'i/Persian project, which is a mixture of fanaticism, sectarianism, and Persian racial supremacy. This project has already been implemented in some countries around us, such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. In there is a secret plan behind Iranian tourism, and that is spreading Shi'ism in Egypt. Shi'a are preparing themselves for the reappearance of the awaited Mahdi [a messianic figure whom most Shi'a identify with the "hidden Imam" they believe will appear before the Judgement Day] in Egypt, then to go to Saudi Arabia to destroy the sacred Ka'ba. . . . a crowd of over 1,000 people gathered and two Salafi sheikhs were seen making phone calls and apparently directing people. The crowd began hurling stones and Molotov cocktails into the house. Four of the men inside, including the Shia religious leader Sheikh Hassan Shehata, left the house during the attack to protect those who remained inside, including women and children. The crowd attacked, beat, stabbed and lynched the four men. Video footage shows their bloodied lifeless bodies being kicked on the ground and then dragged through the streets. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that from the outset three vans of riot police who had been dispatched were stationed nearby but that they failed to intervene to disperse the mob.
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According to a report published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, a week before the incident, in mid-June 2013, Egyptian and Saudi Salafi clerics organized a conference in Cairo, at which they spurred anti-Shi'a sentiment by denouncing Shi'a as "filthy" and "non-believers who must be killed." The report went on to say that, "just over a week later a mob in a village on the outskirt of Cairo murdered four Egyptian Shias." 37 As one high-ranking Shi'i researcher at the Fatimid Egypt Center for Studies asserted in connection to this particular killing, Salafis are using religious and political rhetoric against Shi'a for their own political interests. Creating such a sense of hatred through religious and sectarian language has led to the death of Shaykh Hasan Shahhata. They can influence the masses easily. 38 In another incident from summer 2012, an Egyptian Shi'i 'Imad Qandil, living in the Nile Delta village of Ragdiyya near Tanta, reported that Salafis had threatened him with physical violence and that the security forces did not take action to prevent growing sectarian attacks against his fellow Shi Egyptian Salafis' rhetoric of securitizing the country's Shi'a community also carries a strong regional dimension, insofar as the community's demonization is being closely linked to Iran and the broader sectarian divisions in the region. As one Egyptian Shi'i researcher in Islamic and Shi'a affairs argues, "the fear and securitization of Shi'a and Shi'ism in Egypt is purely a political agenda, which is often linked to Iran." 43 This analysis is supported by others, including Shi'a activist Muhammad Ghunaym, who asserts that "hostility against Shias is political rather than religious and revolves around Saudi Arabia and Iran's competing ambitions." To this Ghunaym adds:
Egypt's Shi'a are currently paying the price for what Shi'a in other countries are doing. Egyptian Shi'a as a whole have no effect on national security, and we know that they could gather us all up in police trucks and silence us in a day. But the objective of what is happening with Egypt's Shi'a is to send a message abroad. One illustrative case of just how Salafis have linked the sectarian issue to Iran and its regional policy, as mentioned by Ghunaym and others, concerns the issue of Iranian tourism to Egypt. Prior to 2012, tourism between the two countries had been nearly absent, reflecting the state of diplomatic relations between the two nations since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This changed with the election of President Morsi in 2012, under whose short rule two groups of Iranian tourists were allowed to visit as part of a broader effort to normalize bilateral relations. 45 In the wake of these visits, Salafi groups and activists in Egypt sought to portray the tourists as a threat to their religious and national identity, and successfully mobilized people against the Iranian visitors. This was done despite the fact that the visits themselves involved only small groups of tourists, lasted for short periods of time, and that the tourists involved were not allowed to visit any Shi'i places of worship during their stay in the country. 46 As the Nour Party MP mentioned earlier argued in connection to these visits, "we need to become strong enough and prepared enough before letting Shi'a enter our lands," adding that "Iranian tourists visiting here is an Iranian project to promote Shi'ism in Egypt." 47 Other Salafi leaders expressed this idea in the press, 48 and the effect was noticed by the Iranian tourists themselves. In interviews, two Iranians who had visited Egypt recounted having met hostility from some Egyptians both as Iranians and as Shi'a who allegedly insult Egypt's Sunni traditions. Both, however, believed that this animosity was the result of Iran's regional policies and Saudi Arabia's political propaganda.
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Three points are of particular relevance with regards to the anti-Iranian and antiShi'a discourse espoused by Salafi groups during these visits in 2013. Firstly, the visits occurred while President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were in power. Thus the Salafis used the Iranians' visit as an opportunity to distance themselves from the Brotherhood and to present themselves as true protectors of Sunni Islam in Egypt and in the Arab Middle East more broadly. Secondly, this anti-Iranian and anti-Shi'a rhetoric was not espoused by Egypt's secular and nationalist political parties, many of whom did not perceive the visitors as a security threat.
50 Doubting the importance of the Iranians' visits to Egypt, one member of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party asserted, for instance, "Do you think 100 Shi'i tourists pose a threat to us? Millions of Christians visit Egypt every year but nothing happens to us." 51 The fact that secular and nationalist parties, as 45 . Since the ouster of President Morsi in July 2013, these tourist visits have been discontinued, with Tourism Minister Hisham Za'zu' arguing that they were suspended due to "national security" concerns. Although hard to verify, it is possible that this suspension was in part the result of Salafi well as the Egyptian army, did not adhere to this sectarian rhetoric yet again suggests that Salafis, as a religious group, are unique in the Egyptian body politic in securitizing the Shi'i population for political purposes and gains. Thirdly, and most fundamentally, considering the small number of Iranian tourists setting foot on Egyptian soil in 2013 (no more than 100 in total, including women and children), it is particularly hard to consider their visits as posing a substantial threat to the survival of Sunni Muslim tradition in Egypt. It is more likely, therefore, that the anti-Shi'a and anti-Iranian rhetoric espoused by Saudi-backed Egyptian Salafis was used instrumentally in an attempt to derail improved bilateral relations between Cairo and Tehran and to further isolate Iran in the wider region. As such, Egypt's Salafis are tapping into a broader regional trend in Sunni Arab sentiment which has shown growing signs of unease, if not outright hostility, toward Tehran's perceived hegemonic policies in the region. Indeed, the narrative of Shi'a as Iranian agents has been widespread in the region since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Events such as the emergence of Hizbullah in Lebanon in the 1980s, the creation of a Shi'a-dominated state in Iraq after 2003, 52 the Syrian civil war since 2011, and the Bahraini uprising of 2011 all affected the regional power struggle and "galvanized public opinion" against Shi'a in the region's Sunni-majority states. 53 More recently, Shi'a in the Arab world have been portrayed as not only the local agents of Iran but also of "Iraq, Hezbollah, or Syria."
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Together these developments fostered a perception of Shi'a as a regional threat to Sunni Arab states and societies, and resulted in growing anti-Shi'a rhetoric, particularly by Salafi and Wahhabi groups and movements in the region. 55 Beyond the depiction of Shi'ism as un-Islamic and linked to Iranian regional ambitions, Salafis in Egypt have also sought to use the constructed "Shi'a threat" as a means of gaining popular support at home and of distancing themselves from other Islamist groups in the country. Indeed, Salafi anti-Shi'a rhetoric is not only driven by political and theological factors, but also by the growing rivalry between different Sunni Islamic groups in Egypt itself, particularly between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood during the Morsi era. In fact, prior to the latter's banning, Salafis and the Brotherhood perceived one another very much as rivals on the political scene, with the former differentiating themselves from the more moderate Islamists by presenting themselves as the true protectors of Sunni Islam. and the US to bargain for further political and economic advantages. 57 Even the spokesperson of the Salafi Front, Khalid Sa'id, alluded to the possibility that some of Salafis' anti-Shi'ism might be politically motivated. 58 The idea that Salafis were posturing in order to challenge the Brotherhood's claim to represent true Egyptian Islam was supported by various observers and participants in Egyptians politics interviewed for this article. For instance, one member of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party asserted, "Salafis, as an attempt to prove that they are more Islamist than the Muslim Brotherhood, went fanatic. In so doing, they need to be more hardliner than the others. This is the Salafi strategy."
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In sum, it is apparent that since 2011 Egypt's Salafis have sought to securitize the Shi'a question domestically through speech acts, both by depicting Shi'ism as un-Islamic or heretical, and by associating the community with Iran's regional ambitions. In so doing, they are not only perpetuating a growing sectarian discourse in the broader region, but also are in danger of inciting further sectarian violence in Egypt itself. Indeed, these attempts at mobilizing anti-Shi'a sentiment in Egypt are the result of emotionally laden ideas, 60 constructed and provoked by radical Salafi elites to motivate people to act against members of the Shi'a community, despite the fact that the Shi'a are a small enough group so as to not pose a security threat to the formidable Sunni identity in Egypt. As Stuart Kaufman aptly remarks, societal violence often occurs when a societal group fears an "existential threat," and that its exaggeration through speech acts is required to make people believe that "our group is in danger." He maintains in this regard that it is not important whether this "existential threat" is real or not, so long as the elites evoking this particular threat are successful in mobilizing their (perceived) target community.
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Such mobilization signifies the politics of securitization in action, as effected by Salafis in Egypt. As suggested above, their anti-Shi'a rhetoric has been successful in mobilizing a segment of Egyptian society against Shi'a, which has led to acts of violence against this particular community.
POLITICIZED IDENTITIES AND SECURITIZED POLITICS: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS
The growth in anti-Shi'a rhetoric by Salafi elites in post-Mubarak Egypt cannot be fully comprehended, of course, without reference to the pervasive nature of identity politics in the region. Indeed, the region's societal make-up, the transnational nature of identities, and the incomplete processes of creating nation-states have made this particular region prone to an internationalization of conflicts. Identities are neither organic nor autochthonous, though they are often portrayed as such in popular discourse. Instead, identities are elastically constructed, politicized, and mobilized, and can simultaneously spill over artificially created borders. This highlights the importance of transnational ideas and ideologies in the Middle East, where a set of states share certain security challenges. Political and security issues have never been solely national in the Middle East, and internal and external security aspects have always been closely interlinked. 62 The so-called Arab Spring continued the shift from inter-state conflicts to intra-state security conflicts. Politicization of identities and securitization of politics are strategies often adopted by societal groups aiming to gain legitimacy and maintain power. Legitimacyseeking thus goes beyond national borders. Societal groups, parties, and factions, as part of transnational political identity conflicts, employ the mechanism of us versus them to portray themselves as true protectors of their identity. Securitizing external threats and creating Others therefore aims at the formation of "internal coherence and unity." 63 The main ideational and ideological forces that have been widely employed in the region by states or societal actors for the purpose of such "othering" include Islamism, Arabism, Salafism, Shi'ism, and secularism, among others. Given their transnational characters, all of these forces create a regional security complex, where the local and the regional become inseparable. A pertinent case in point concerns the growth in sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shi'a states/societies in the region, which is becoming increasingly de-territorialized, politicized, and intolerant. 64 Indeed, as Guido Steinberg argues, this Sunni/Shi'i division is not purely theological in nature, but is political, with each side perceiving the other as a threat to their sectarian identity and instrumentally using the sectarian card for political ends. 65 Indeed, this sectarian rhetoric has become one of the methods employed by Sunni states and societal actors to contain Shi'a empowerment in the Middle East. This containment strategy is manifest at both state and societal levels. As part of this strategy, Sunni-governed regimes, particularly those with large Shi'a communities such as those of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, have pursued a twopronged policy, "othering" Shi'a at societal level and pursuing a regional policy that has sought to prevent Tehran's normalization of relations with the region's Sunni Arab states. Saudi Arabia is at the forefront of this containment strategy, particularly in its support for Salafi groups across the region, 69 a fact highlighted by several research respondents. As a senior member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood asserted:
Salafis receive unlimited help from the Gulf states. This is to support their strategic policies against Iran and to put pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are countries that support such policies.
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This view is shared by a member of the liberal Egyptian Current Party who stated that "Saudi Arabia finances Salafis to promote Wahhabism and also to depict Shi'a as hostile and enemy." 71 A Shi'i professor in an Egyptian university corroborated this point, asserting that "the Shi'a-Sunni enmity and hatred that is occurring these days in the Middle East is the result of regional Wahhabi policies, which are trying to affect not only Egypt but also Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq." This article suggests that Egypt's Salafis in the post-Mubarak era have deployed this anti-Iranian, anti-Shi'a rhetoric as a diversionary tactic to gain domestic legitimacy and support. As part of this discourse, Salafis sought to present Iran -rather than Israel, which has traditionally been singled out as the principal foe in both Arab nationalist and Islamist discourse -as the main national enemy and as a threat to the Sunni Muslim identity of Egypt, and the broader region. Indeed, for Egypt's Salafis, Israel is arguably not singled out as an ideological threat for two primary reasons: firstly, because Israel was seen too strong to deal with 77 and, secondly, because the Salafis did not want to appear anti-Western. 78 Various respondents on the matter corroborate this observation. As a former senior Egyptian diplomat asserted on the matter: "Salafis talk about Shi'a in a way they never talk about Israelis. They have no objection to Israeli tourists but they do about Iranian tourists." 79 Meanwhile, a member of the Nour Party and the 2011/12 parliament justified this discrepancy in the discourse by stating, "We are not afraid of the Zionist tourists, because Egyptians will not convert to Judaism. However, we are not immune from the threat of Shi'a ideologies. It is more likely for an Egyptian to convert to Shi'ism than to Judaism or Christianity." 80 Highlighting its instrumental value, a member of the Nasserist Dignity Party (or Hizb al-Karama) asserted that, "if Salafis do not complain about Israeli tourists but they do complain about Iranians it is because they want to trigger a sensitive sectarian issue."
Salafis are concerned that Iran and Hizbullah's success in their regional policies, especially in their enmity with Israel may buy loyalty of those Egyptians, and consequently may encourage them to convert to Shi'ism. For example, Hizbullah's 2006 war with Israel dramatically increased its popularity among Egyptians. So did Iran's anti-American and anti-Israeli policies in the region. 82 The deterioration of an already fragile relationship between Cairo and Tehran is closely linked to regional rivalry between Iran and the Gulf states. The current regional dynamics, particularly Iran's regional ambitions, acutely contribute to Sunni/Shi'a division and further intensify it, as is evident in Egypt's domestic power struggle. Iran benefits and encourages "transitional Shi'a revivalism" in the region. 83 Meanwhile, Salafis in Egypt and elsewhere in the region have instrumentally sought to contain Iran's increasing regional influence, particularly in the Sunni majority states by securitizing Shi'a minorities. Hence, Sunni Islamists' rhetoric toward Shi'a is driven in response to both internal and external actors; Salafis were and are against the normalization of diplomatic relations between Cairo and Tehran. The recent nuclear deal reached between Iran and the West is perceived by many in the Arab world as a threat that further strengthens Iran's position in the region. As such it is to be expected that the deal will further fuel the current region-wide sectarian proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia. To contain Iran's regional hegemonic ambitions and its soft power capacity, Salafis have targeted Iran's only tool to expand its power in the region: Shi'ism.
CONCLUSION
Sunni/Shi'a feuds are neither new to Egypt nor to the broader region, nor are they peculiar to the Salafis. What is new, however, is the emergence of Salafism as a political force in Egyptian politics after the so-called Arab Spring and the recourse by some of the newly created Salafi political parties to sectarian discourse. As part of this discourse, Salafis have instrumentally constructed Sunnism as a referent object (threatened) and securitized the Shi'a community as an Other (threatening). This securitization process has taken place through speech acts used by the securitizing actors (Salafis) to mobilize people against the perceived threat (Shi'a) and to defend the referent object (Sunni identity).
This article aimed to explore the rationale behind the Salafi construction of Shi'a in Egypt as a security threat, despite the fact that the Shi'a community itself is incapable of posing a demographic or political threat to the formidable Sunni tradition in the country. Essentially, it demonstrated that two factors enabled the Salafis to politicize and consequently securitize the Shi'a and Shi'ism in Egypt. These include the power vacuum after the toppling of President Husni Mubarak, which facilitated the rise of Salafis as a political force alongside secular nationalist groups and moderate Is- 
